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Lindeman Island: Environmental Politics 
in Queensland 
by Timothy J. Doyle 
The Lindeman Island campaign was an extremely short one for 
the conservation movement. Due to its brevity, there was little time 
for participants to record events as they were happening. As a 
consequence, written records, such as correspondence and minutes 
of meetings, are sparse. In their relative absence, much of the 
following analysis has been based on personal contact, using media 
excerpts to verify and illustrate these accounts. 
In ten days in late February and early March 1986, 56,000 
signatures were collected throughout Queensland to petition the state 
parliament concerning the National Party Government's plans to 
revoke two-thirds of Lindeman Island national park. Only once 
before has this figure been surpassed: in 1918, 80,000 signatures were 
gathered to oppose the then ALP Government's intention of reducing 
drinking hours in Queensland hotels. The Lindeman Island issue was 
hailed as a conservation cause with enough pohtical impetus to force 
National Party parliamentarians to cross the floor. 
This feat is remarkable given the cultural context. In the second 
volume of his history of Queensland, Ross Fitzgerald opens his 
chapter on the environment and its position in Queensland culture 
in a clear and direct manner. He writes: 
Fundamental to Country (National) Party development pohcy was, 
and is, a blatant disregard for the environment.' 
Fitzgerald's contention is wholeheartedly supported by Hundloe who 
argues that the politicians who have dominated government in 
Queensland have been 'country folk who beheved in taming and 
converting land for the purpose of agriculture or grazing . . .'^  The 
consequence of this dominance by rural-based politicians — beheving 
in the intrinsic worthlessness of 'unworked', natural landscapes — 
led to strong development-oriented pohcies determined to 'bring 
Queensland into the twentieth century'. 
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This strong, defined anti-environmental ethos did more than just 
ensure the destruction of many Queensland habitats. The strength 
of this commitment polarised dissenting thought into an equally weh-
defined, viable philosophical and political force. Consequently — 
and somewhat ironically — with the advent of the issue to protect 
the Great Barrier Reef, Queensland became 'the birthplace of 
Austrahan environmental politics' in the mid-sixties.' 
Since the Reef issue, other environmental controversies have 
enjoyed primacy on the Queensland state, political agenda: sand-
mining at Cooloola and the islands Fraser, Moreton and North 
Stradbroke; hmestone mining at Mount Etna Caves; the Iwasaki 
development; the logging of the Wet Tropical Forests; and the most 
recent attempts to mine for silica at Shelburne Bay. Because of the 
perceived polarisation, ah of these issues have been direct conflicts. 
These conflicts have been portrayed as a clash between two 'sides'; 
the National Party with its supporters of progress and development; 
and the conservation interests of what is so often referred to as the 
urban-based, middle-class. 
The case of Lindeman Island Ulustrated that conservation concerns 
are not the exclusive domain of left-wing, middle-class, city-dwehers; 
but of society as a whole. The usual land-use conflict lines were most 
confused and disturbed during this period. A number of inherent 
facets of the issue, coupled with the unique strategies of the 
conservation movement prevented the polarisation of interests from 
occurring. 
The question must be asked, 'Why did this environmental issue 
generate such media coverage as to reach the status of a full scale 
political affair, transcending traditional boundaries?' A commonly 
aired assumption is that the Lindeman issue had fcir broader public 
appeal than other conservation issues which had made their way onto 
the political agenda. The National Times read: 
One Government employee, wiping his brow with reUef at the news, 
said the proposal had spawned more pubhc protest than any other 
conservation issue — including "the Daintree, kangaroos and 
crocodiles".'* 
At first glance, this seems to be an attractive answer. According to 
activists in conservation organisations, large numbers of those signing 
the petition had not figured in previous campaigns. Lindeman was 
an issue the average Queenslander could grasp. It was not about the 
rights of forest species to exist independently of humanity's 
perception — or more expediently — about the necessity of scientific 
and genetic diversity. Lindeman was a conservation issue which 
invited and utilised human arguments; for example, as one man put 
it: 'the great danger in this issue was that our quality of life was about 
to be sold to the highest bidder'.^ 
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As this particular argument proceeds, it is not necessarily the 
broadness of its appeal that stands out; but the intellectual 
conservatism of its major thrusts. And so the penny drops: it is not 
the widespread appeal of the issue that promotes 'success', but the 
power, the political force of conservatism in this state, evident in both 
political argument and action.* 
This is the key point of this paper. It wiU investigate the conservative 
appeal of the Lindeman issue and the consequent mobihsation of 
those networks which inhabit the conservative periphery of what is 
loosely and symbolically termed the conservation movement.' 
SCENARIO 
The Lindeman affair occurred just as the Philippines hovered on 
the brink of civil war as opponents of the Marcos dictatorship 
manoeuvred themselves into a position which was irreconcilable. It 
seemed at some stages that the power of the Marcos regime was so 
absolute that no victory could possibly be accorded to its opponents. 
The Philippine media told the story: against all possible odds, the 
will of the people, committed as one, overthrew the regime without 
unnecessary bloodshed. 
This scenario has far more than just chronological comparisons 
with the Lindeman Island issue. Sections of the Queensland public 
viewed the Bjelke-Petersen Government as being similarly invincible. 
Bjelke-Petersen's political might had been demonstrated time and 
time again with victories over other political parties, unions, civil 
rights activists, environmentalists; in fact anyone who crossed his 
path. There was a pervasive hopelessness among his opponents. The 
overthrow of the previously unvanquished Marcos, and the concurrent 
victory of what the media termed as 'people's power', gave Bjelke-
Petersen's opponents new hope. 
Other factors which later proved favourable for Bjelke-Petersen's 
antagonists related to the internal politics of the Queensland National 
Party; it was an election year in Queensland. Characteristically, 
politicians of aU makes and moulds perform a bit of soul-searching 
at this time. This introspection, more often than not, was coupled 
with back-bench dissent becoming rather better publicised than is 
usually tolerated. The case of Earle Bailey's overtness in opposing 
the wishes of his premier was well-documented by the Queensland 
press. For example, Sanderson wrote: 
In comparatively well-educated, aware and affluent Toowong . . . 
it would have been political suicide if Bailey had done anything 
but fight the revocation of the National Park, which cynics suggest 
was the source of his concern for the environment. 
Apart from the proximity of the election, other issues were at work 
within the party. The East-West deal illustrated the remarkable come-
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back of Sir Edward Lyons into the public forum as recently elected 
chairman of the airline. It was less than a year before the Lindeman 
deal that Lyons was forced to resign as chairman of the Queensland 
TAB after disclosures that he breached TAB betting rules.^ 
Despite the fact that cronyism, nepotism and short memories are 
not new phenomena to Queensland state politics, the rank and file 
of the National Party reacted negatively after considering Sir 
Edward's credentials. This misapprehension was further fuelled by 
media statements made by Sir Edward concerning his opponents. The 
Daily Sun quoted him as saying: 
But they can all go to heO — that vocal minority doesn't know 
what is good for Queensland.'" 
Most importantly, however, party opposition to Lyons was 
championed by the President of the Nationals himself. Sir Robert 
Sparkes, who, in turn, provided a catalyst which aggravated another 
long-standing source of internal conflict within the party. Stewart 
commented on these conflicts: 
They are generally a tussle of strength involving Sir Robert Sparkes 
with a clear direction that the party must take after analysing all 
the market research pulling back Sir Job from his idiosyncratic 
journey into hydrogen cars, quack cancer curves, quack economic 
cures and the friendly lures of his closest friend. Sir Edward 
Lyons." 
Loane, writing for the National Times, also reported a rift between 
the leader of the organisational wing and the leader of the 
parliamentary wing: 
Sparkes. . . scented in Lindeman a political disaster hke last May's 
abortion raids . . . an infuriated Bjelke-Petersen said Sparkes was 
"talking a lot of hot air" and the battle was on.'* 
There were other factors which contributed to a favourable political 
scenario. Financiers doubted the capacity of East-West to turn its 
resort concept into a viable, profit making concern. Many speculators 
judged that the long-standing two-airline system dominated by Ansett 
and TAA — now Australian Airlines — was too powerful to he taken 
on. In the lead-up to the Lindeman deal, TAA had made it quite 
clear that it would evict East-West from its terminal once East-West 
started up in direct competition on the coastal routes.'^ 
WHO WERE THE CONSERVATIVES? 
The network of groups and individuals that were activated by the 
Lindeman issue were largely conservative and have engaged in very 
little environmental activity. 
A number of interviews with key activists in the campaign 
established that the Lindeman Island issue had attracted much greater 
466 
conservative input than was evident in other recent campaigns."' 
Activists noted that a far larger proportion of both volunteers and 
attendees at public meetings were in older age brackets than they had 
previously encountered. Also, there was a greater level of involvement 
from regional areas. Each of these social categories represents, to 
an extent, a more conservative political outlook. 
An excellent example of regional involvement is found in the 
Northern Downs News, the local paper of Dalby and its surrounding 
Darling Downs. The article's heading reads 'Lindeman Decision 
Pleases Locals'. It then continues: 
At the March meeting of the Dalby branch of the Wild Life 
Preservation Society (WPSQ), members enthusiastically greeted 
news of the withdrawal of the proposal to revoke the National Park 
Status of Lindeman Island.' 
The participation of Dalby branch of WPSQ in the Lindeman 
campaign is an excellent example of conservative involvement. Its 
political and intellectual conservatism is such that the Dalby branch 
refuses membership of the Queensland Conservation Council, due 
largely to the latter's pro-nuclear disarmament stance." This gesture 
becomes particularly poignant if one takes into account the fact that 
the central directorate of WPSQ is a member body. An interesting 
aside here is that Sir Robert Sparkes, President of the National Party, 
was also a member of the Dalby WPSQ. 
In specific terms, other conservative individuals and groups, bound 
by a common goal and collective activity, became an active part of 
the conservation movement for those three weeks in which Lindeman 
Island remained on the political agenda. They included the Western 
Division of the Country Women's Association based at Longreach; 
several National Party shire councils such as Beaudesert; the 
Whitsunday Tourist and Development Association; and the 50 
farming families in the Taroom area who demanded that their local 
National Party representative take their petition against the revocation 
directly to the Premier. 
LINDEMAN: THE ISSUE AND THE MOVEMENT 
The conservative appeal of the Lindeman issue must be explored. 
Some of its intrinsic conservatism lies in the fact that Lindeman was 
fought not to gain ground, but to save it. It was a fight for 
conservationists to resist retreat. A national park had been declared, 
and the due processes of law had been fulfilled. On this occasion 
it was not a matter of creating new legislation to protect new areas 
from exploitation, but to defend established laws now under attack, 
from unsavoury pohtical dealings. This point can not be overstated. 
The conservatism of the issue itself goes only part of the way in 
explaining the almost unprecedented support for the continued 
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protection of Lindeman Island. The real answer lies with the 
conscious enticement and encouragement of right-wing elements 
within the movement by conservation organisations. 
It is essential, at this stage, to clarify the role of the conservation 
organisation within the broader conservation movement. The 
movement comprises a vast array of groups, organisations and 
individuals."" Its physical fragmentation is a reflection of a broad 
range of differing goals and means of achieving objectives. It is not 
possible to ascertain the exact number of conservation groups 
operating at any one time. The movement is constantly changing. 
As issues appear on the political agenda, new groups form. As the 
issue in question disappears from public view, then the group may 
also become obsolete. 
The movement's membership, therefore, is a fluid one. It comprises 
many individuals who are not necessarily 'card carrying' members 
of specific conservation organisations. In the case of Lindeman 
Island, a cluster of organisations, groups and individuals shared 
common goals and, in matching this united concern with collective 
action, they became a series of conservation networks. Five major 
conservation organisations were most prominent in the Lindeman 
Island network: the Queensland Conservation Council, the Wildhfe 
Preservation Society of Queensland, the Rainforest Conservation 
Society of Queensland, the Australian Conservation Foundation and 
The Wilderness Society.'^  
The media generally perceived this list of five conservation 
organisations as being the full participative extent of the movement 
in the case of Lindeman. However, the conservation movement is 
far more than just a political lobby group incorporating a handful 
of powerful organisations: it is a social movement. The media's 
narrow perception of the movement indicated the complicated nature 
of the movement and, more importantly, the media's editorial and 
structural conservatism in only reporting on human relations which 
are institutionalised to such an extent that they comprise formal 
groupings.'* 
Given the bias towards formal organisations — supported by 
dominant interest group theories of political science and sociology 
— the media neglected the significance of inputs from informal 
networks operating within the movement. When non-organisational 
participants were referred to, they were not portrayed as being part 
of the movement — which they were — but instead, members of the 
so-called apolitical 'pubhc'." 
The media's static and well-defined portrayal of the conservation 
movement takes political power away from the movement. It enables 
critics to point their fingers at movement organisations as mutant. 
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subversive, or in the words of the Courier-Mail as not 'representative 
of the average Queenslander'. 
To conclude this point, members of the public who became involved 
in the Lindeman conservation campaign were part — albeit 
temporarily — of the conservation movement. The organisations were 
riders on the crest of a wave generated throughout aU of society. The 
division between organisation and movement must be clarified and 
strengthened. Piven and Cloward write: 
The stress on conscious intentions in these usages reflects a 
confusion in the literature between the mass movement on the one 
hand, and the formahsed organisations which tend to emerge on 
the crest of the movement on the other hand — two intertwined 
but distinct phenomena.^" 
THE ORGANISATIONAL ROLE 
The fact that huge conservative groundswell already existed prior 
to organisational involvement must not be utihsed to downplay the 
importance of the role played by the conservation organisations in 
the Lindeman affair. 
Lindeman Island, according to Don Henry — Director of Wildhfe 
Preservation Society of Queensland — was a 'fly by the seat of your 
pants' campaign.^' There was no time available to evolve a decision-
making process which was truly representative of conservation 
thought throughout Queensland. Due to the urgency of the issue these 
shortcomings were ignored by other movement participants. This 
scenario enabled the five most powerful conservation organisations 
in Queensland to take the reins and operate 'effectively' and 
'efficiently', as only hierarchical organisations can do. 
Despite this urgency, there was time enough for conscious decisions 
to be made by organisational leaders who, in turn, created a campaign 
focus for the rest of the movement. Three of these decisions proved 
crucial to a positive outcome of the campaign. First of aU, 
organisational activists decided to play the Queensland state political 
game. This decision was made in light of recent poor conservation 
performances in the Wet Tropical Forests campaign which relied 
wholeheartedly on the Federal Government's power of intervention. 
Also, it assured Queenslanders that they would not be 'running with 
the socialists down south'. 
There were some unconscious benefits of this strategy. By 
concentrating on state politics, it further enticed right-wing input. 
Queenslanders were invited to play a part in their political system; 
a system of 'democracy' which the majority of conservatives believe 
is the only legitimate political stage. Organisational leaders showed 
the conservatives their so-called 'responsibility' and 'shared faith' 
in the political system on ah possible occasions. The Daily Sun 
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reports: 
They (conservationists) said the fight for environmental protection 
would not end until there was legistlative reform.^^ 
The end goal — legislative reform — was, and remains, most 
attractive to conservative elements. Emphasising this gave all 
concerned a clear — although short-term — strategic goal: to have 
the Lindeman Island revocation bill voted out of Parliament before 
its current sitting was over. 
The second conscious decision made by these organisations was 
to remain non-party political. In previous State and Federal elections, 
conservation organisations — such as the Queensland Conservation 
Council — had directed votes in favour of the Australian Labor 
Party." The most recent example of party affiliation occurred in the 
1987 Federal Election when the Austrahan Conservation Foundation 
and The Wilderness Society endorsed Labor in the House of 
Representatives. This one party stance had alienated conservation 
as a cause for Labor voters and denied the organisations far broader 
support in the community. In the Lindeman issue, this non-party 
political stance was essential if the power and influence of 
conservatives supporting the Liberal and National parties were to 
be utilised to their fuh potential. 
Finally, there was concerted effort to play pohtics in the pubhc 
sphere. The lobbying of politicians was of secondary importance to 
capitahsing on the unprecedented groundswell of support which had 
taken on new meaning since the overthrow of Marcos in the 
Philippines. Public meetings were arranged and record crowds flowed 
out of Brisbane's School of Arts building into Ann Street. 
The five conservation organisations utilised the petition as a symbol 
of personal involvement in the campaign. Martin writes in favour 
of the petition as a public mobihsation tool in environmental politics: 
If the main purpose of the petition had been to impress pohticians, 
it would have been mainly an appeal-to-ehtes method. But since 
the main purpose was stimulating involvement in the movement 
and contact with many people about the issues, the signature drive 
was mainly a grassroots method.^' 
The petition also acted as a tangible barometer of public support 
which was most attractive to the media's craving for the quantifiable. 
As final evidence of fhe conservative attractiveness of this 
campaign, one only has to refer, yet again, to the popular press. The 
11 March edition of the Daily Sun featured Lyon's 'go to hell' 
statement to Lindeman conservationists on the front page. On page 
three of the same edifion the headlines read: 'Shots, threats in forest 
protest'. Of course these words refer Jto the Farmhouse Creek 
campaign in Tasmania. Due largely to the conservative appeal and 
resultant activity associated with Lindeman and, on the other hand, 
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the radical direct action antics of Farmhouse Creek, there is never 
mention of these two campaigns being philosophically or politically 
linked together in the Daily Sun, or any other media outlet operating 
in Queensland.^ '* 
The five organisations involved in the Lindeman issue 
demonstrated the ability to act swiftly, decisively, and at all times, 
conservatively. 
THE POWER OF CONSERVATIVE ACTION AND ARGUMENT 
After East-West withdrew its plans for Lindeman Island, the 
Premier, Sir Job Bjelke-Petersen told the media: 
I congratulate all you people 100 percent on doing a good job in 
knocking off 2000 jobs. I'm very disappointed in you people. Not 
one of you cares two hoots about the jobs.^^ 
The Premier blamed media bias for his defeat. This accusation 
was treated by the media with contempt. It was an attempt by Bjelke-
Petersen to find a scapegoat, thus removing the political heat from 
himself. The media's stance on the Lindeman issue was supportive 
of Bjelke-Petersen's opponents; this rarely happens on conservation 
issues. On this one occasion the Queensland media presented the 
Lindeman campaign as one with broad based, representative support. 
The conservation movement has always had support in every section 
of society. The question must be asked, 'Why, on this occasion, does 
the media report this broad support, when usually it regards the 
movement as a left-wing, minority lobby group?' 
The media's unusual stance can only be understood in the context 
of this concerted and intense conservative mobilisation within the 
movement. Conservative action and argument is, without doubt, the 
key to the media's door. 
Another unprecedented source of support came from the 
Queensland Pohce Force. In the midst of the campaugn — 5 March 
— the five organisations had set up a petition table in King George 
Square. It was not until the next day that the City Council instructed 
The Wilderness Society to cease with the petition until the Society 
had obtained a permit from the Police Force, which usually takes 
one week. After hearing of the Wilderness Society's predicament, 
the police organised a permit within thirty minutes, and in so doing 
made local radio headhnes in the lunchtime news edition. Other 
petition tables set up outside the Queensland Conservation Council 
and in George Street without permits were never challenged, and in 
the words of one Wilderness Society worker, the police 'were 
extremely and unusually helpful'.^ * 
It was not the fact that Lindeman was intrinsicahy a broad issue 
that enticed the support of the police and media; but that it was 
fought largely by conservatives, in a conservative manner. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Lindeman campaign has several conclusions. First, it 
demonstrated, with unusual clarity, the fact that conservation issues 
have support throughout all of society. The movement cannot be 
delimited on a class or party political basis. Secondly, it saw the 
mobilisation of the normally dormant, right-wing elements of this 
vast mass movement. Next, it illustrated ways in which the 
conservation movement can gain continued access and support from 
powerful societal institutions such as the media and the police. 
The trade-offs, of course, are immense. The mobilisation of the 
conservative networks, and the dominance of its arguments and 
actions over others within the movement, has led to the adoption 
of goals which are short-term, non-confrontationary, and above all, 
acceptable to the dominant regime. 
Perhaps this is the real message of the Lindeman Island Affair. 
After many years of frustration with the Queensland pohtical system, 
the conservation movement is starting to play the game as it is written 
for them by the ruling hegemonic order. Increasingly, if it continues 
to accept these rules, 'successes' like Lindeman will no doubt be 
repeated but gradually the more radical messages of the movement 
whl be weakened and co-opted into the dominant society. 
Finally, the Lindeman Island Affair may have tolled the death-
kneh for Bjelke-Petersen and his supporters. At long last, 
Queenslanders responded to allegations of government corruption, 
cronyism, and the abuse of power. It took an environmental issue 
to force their hand. 
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